We review recent evidence and future directions for empirical research on financial contracting in the context of corporate finance. Specifically, we survey evidence pertaining to incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions between financial contracts and other governance mechanisms. We also discuss directions for future research, concluding that the financial contracting approach offers a potentially fruitful perspective for empirical researchers seeking to better understand a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance.
INTRODUCTION
In laying the foundation for the role of incentives in corporate finance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterize the firm as a nexus of contracts. Since then, a great deal of theoretical research has focused on rationalizing and characterizing the different contractual relations between firms and their investors. This rich and growing theoretical literature -often referred to as financial contracting or security design -includes models based on a variety of economic principles, such as costly state verification, adverse selection, moral hazard, the allocation of control rights, and risk sharing. Yet, despite their different assumptions, this literature is united by its primary purpose, which is to derive optimal mechanisms, i.e., contracts, for overcoming various frictions between agents.
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While empirical research on financial contracting has progressed more slowly than the theory, there have been a number of recent exciting advancements as applied researchers become aware of the theoretical insights of financial contracting and take advantage of novel data sources. Our main goals with this survey are to review the empirical evidence on financial contracting and provide direction for future empirical research. Through this survey, we hope to convey our belief that the richness of the theoretical financial contracting literature offers many opportunities for applied researchers to broaden our understanding of a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance. 2 From the outset, we acknowledge the limitations of our review. We restrict attention to the contracting relationships between the firm and its investors, primarily creditors and shareholders, leaving other important contractual relations, such as those with employees and customers, to other studies. 3 We also exclude most research on corporate capital structure, or the usage and mix of various corporate securities, which is closely related to financial contracting. 4 We motivate this distinction with the fact that much of the empirical capital structure literature takes the existence of financial securities such as debt and equity as given. We believe that the financial contracting literature, where optimal securities are derived as opposed to assumed, offers a novel perspective on positive and normative questions in empirical capital structure research.
Finally, financial contracting is one form of corporate governance, a subject exhaustively and expertly reviewed in the survey article of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . 5 However, our survey is quite different from theirs in two dimensions. First, our emphasis is on the characteristics of financial contracts and the implications of these contract characteristics for corporate behavior, as opposed to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration.
Second, much of our review focuses on recent empirical evidence on the governance role of large creditors. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note, there was almost no empirical evidence on the role of creditors in corporate governance at the time of their survey.
The remainder of the review begins with an introduction to the relevant theory. The goal with this discussion is to illuminate the basic ideas and concepts of financial contracting theory and highlight the fundamental concepts on which the empirical literature has focused. Doing so provides for a natural organizational structure for the subsequent discussion of the empirical evidence. We discuss several key concepts highlighted by the theoretical literature: incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions with other governance mechanisms. While these concepts are far from exhaustive, they have received the most attention from empirical researchers.
Much of the review is spent discussing debt securities. This does not reflect a judgment on the relative importance of financial contracts. Rather, we choose to focus on debt contracts because they are typically more complex securities containing numerous features and provisions that create a significant amount of heterogeneity within this class of securities. In addition, debt, or debt-like, securities often emerge as the optimal contract in financial contracting theories.
Finally, empirical evidence on the design of debt securities and the role of creditors has received significantly less attention in previous reviews of capital structure and corporate governance.
informationally-sensitive security (Myers and Majluf (1984) ). Several excellent surveys of the capital structure literature include Harris and Raviv (1991) , Myers (2003) , Frank and Goyal (2008), and Titman and Parson (2008) . 5 Zingales (2000) also provides a number of insights into financial contracting. See the articles by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2008) for surveys of the role of boards of directors in corporate governance.
We close the survey with concluding thoughts for future research. Our focus on future directions reflects our view that the literature surveyed here represents only the first chapter in an exciting novel of future empirical financial contracting research.
FINANCIAL CONTRACTING THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Given our primary focus on empirical research, this section presents and discusses a small number of the most visible theoretical papers that have had the largest influence on empirical work in financial contracting thus far. We refer the readers to the original papers for more detail. Further, as consumers of theoretical research focused on the empirical evidence, we draw heavily from the outstanding surveys by Harris and Raviv (1992) , Allen and Winton (1995) and Hart (2001) , as well as the texts by Bolton and Dewatripont (2006) and Tirole (2007) .
Incentive Conflicts and Control Rights
One of the distinguishing characteristics of theoretical financial contracting research is the assumption of incentive conflicts and the derivation of optimal securities in the presence of these conflicts. One of the earliest examples is Townsend (1979) . His model of costly state verification is based on a simple risk-sharing problem between a risk-neutral agent (i.e., lender)
with constant income and a risk-averse agent (i.e., borrower) with random income. The market imperfection is that the borrower's income can be hidden, and the lender is required to pay an "audit" cost in order to verify the borrower's true income. Townsend derives the optimal incentive compatible contract, where incentive compatibility refers to a contract that ensures "good" behavior by the borrower -truthful revelation regarding income.
The contract has the following features. Income is verified whenever reported income is below a certain level -a level that implicitly incorporates the audit cost ultimately borne by the borrower should income need be verified. Payments to the lender are constant when income is not verified, and payments are strictly lower than this when income is verified. This contract has many features of a simple debt contract, a point Gale and Hellwig (1985) reinforce by showing that if both agents are risk-neutral, the optimal contract gives all of the borrower's income to the lender whenever this income falls below the unverified fixed payment. Diamond (1984) derives debt as the optimal contract in a similar setting but uses non-pecuniary penalties that impose a disutility equal to the payment shortfall as a disciplining device, as opposed to an audit cost.
The key insight from these models is that the debt contract is a useful financing arrangement because the penalties that nonpayment imposes on the borrower -audit costs and disutility -ensure truthful revelation by the borrower. In other words, the contract aligns the incentives between the borrower and lender because of the costs that lenders may impose upon borrowers when the borrower misbehaves. These foundational models of financial contracting highlight the importance of incentive conflicts in the derivation of optimal securities.
The incomplete contracts paradigm pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Moore (1988, 1990) shifts the focus from the allocation of cash flows to the allocation of control rights. Additionally, whereas costly state verification focuses mainly on managers' incentives, the incomplete contracting literature emphasizes investors' incentives as well. However, it is crucial to note that incentive conflicts remain the key friction motivating the security design problem. The key additional assumption that distinguishes this literature is that in dynamic relationships, eventualities arise upon which parties cannot contract. Thus, any contract will be "incomplete" in the sense that it does not address every possible future contingency. Aghion and Bolton (1992) build on this idea by assuming that a wealth-constrained entrepreneur has an investment opportunity requiring financing. Whereas investors care only about project cash flows, entrepreneurs care about both project cash flows and non-pecuniary private benefits (e.g., personal satisfaction, reputational enhancements). As Aghion and Bolton show, the resolution of this conflict depends to a large extent on who has the right to make decisions, such as to continue or to terminate the project, once the relationship is underway. The optimal contract allocates the decision right in a state contingent manner: when the state of the world is such that monetary profit maximization is most (least) efficient, the investor (entrepreneur) receives control. The cutoff delineating investor-entrepreneur control is determined so that the investor breaks even, and the contingent allocation is achieved by conditioning the control right on a contractible, but noisy, signal of the state of the world.
As in the costly state verification models, this contract resembles debt financing by giving control to creditors in states of the world in which the incentive conflicts are likely to bias managers towards inefficient behavior. More simply put, when things go well for the entrepreneur (e.g., high cash flow, low leverage, high net worth), they retain control over the investment project. When things go poorly, control shifts to the investor. It is important to emphasize that the contractible signal in the Aghion and Bolton (1992) The different assumptions introduce an interesting empirical question: do shifts in control to creditors occur uniquely in a situation of payment default on debt? We examine research on this question in Section III.
Collateral
A basic consequence of the incentive conflict underlying contracting models is a reduction in pledgeable income, or the amount of money that borrowers can credibly commit to return to investors. One important way in which managers can boost pledgeable income is through the pledging of collateral, such as liquid assets, physical capital, or future project returns.
Collateral helps ensure, to a degree, that investors earn a fair return should the project cash flows fall short of any required payments -either because of a bad draw or because of managerial misbehavior.
Of course, a crucial characteristic of collateral is the ultimate value to investors should they need to seize and sell it, a concept that studies by Hart and Moore (1994 , 1998 ), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996 , among others, refer to as "liquidation value." Simply put, the greater the liquidation value of the collateral, the greater the credit availability since investors can be assured of a higher return. Of course, the cost of pledging assets is that they may have a lower value for the lender then the borrower. For example, there may be direct costs associated with the recovery and resale of assets, borrowers may derive nontransferable private benefits, or some assets may be inherently difficult to sell. Under this assumption, Lacker (1991) shows that collateralized debt is an optimal contract.
7 Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) refine the notion of liquidation value along two dimensions. The former identifies the redeployability of an asset or the option to use the asset for other purposes. Commercial real estate is highly redeployable and therefore associated with higher liquidation value, whereas a specialized asset, such as high-tech medical equipment, is relatively less redeployable and associated with lower liquidation value. The latter study uses an industry equilibrium model to show that liquidation values are affected by the number and financial condition of potential buyers. When borrowers get into financial trouble because of an industry downturn, the resale of collateralized assets by creditors is hampered by the financial troubles of other potential buyers, many of which are in the same industry and affected by the downturn as well.
Renegotiation
Theoretically, renegotiation is an issue that arises largely as an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon (Maskin and Moore (1999) ). When agents design a contract, they are presumably interested in ensuring Pareto optimal outcomes, and so an equilibrium outcome of the contract will be efficient in this sense; that is, there will be no scope for renegotiation. But out of equilibrium, outcomes might be far from Pareto optimal, leaving open the possibility that the agents simply tear up their contract and renegotiate a new one in order to realize any Pareto improvement. 8 Thus, renegotiation can be viewed as a game played by agents when there exists an ex post surplus under the initial terms of the contract.
Such a surplus is most likely to occur when unanticipated or noncontractable states of the world (specifying preferences, endowments, productive technology, etc.) occur. Hart and Moore (1998) show that long term debt contracts are not renegotiation proof, a result subsequently extended to more than two periods by Gromb (1994) . Specifically, when a high cash flow state is realized in their model, the entrepreneur may be able to negotiate down any possibly onerous or restrictive terms in the initial contract. (see also Gorton and Kahn (2000) and Garleanu and Zwiebel (2007) ). Similarly, deteriorations in credit quality can lead to renegotiation when liquidation is ex post Pareto-inefficient because information accrues at an intermediate stage (e.g., von Thadden (1995) ). This phenomenon is referred to as a "softening" of the budget constraint (Tirole (2006) ) and is particularly acute when monetary punishments are limited because of their costs.
In order for changes in credit quality to affect renegotiation, each party must have available outside options -alternative sources of financing for the borrower, alternative sources of business for the lender. As these outside options change, so does the relative bargaining power and ultimate outcome of the renegotiation game. For example, without a credible threat to leave their current lender, borrowers' will have little bargaining power despite any improvements in their financial condition and investment opportunities (Rajan (1992) ).
In addition to the accrual of new information and changing outside options, the original terms of the contract play an important role in renegotiation. Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) examine a setting in which parties are able to control the renegotiation process contractually; in their model, the assignment of ex post bargaining power is specified in the contract rather than being given exogenously (see also Harris and Raviv (1995) ). This perspective is in contrast to other contracting studies that exogenously assume monopolistic bargaining power (Hart and Moore (1988) ) or Nash bargaining (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) ).
This difference is important because Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) show that when the initial contract can impose trade unilaterally at a price prespecified in the contract, the underinvestment problem of Hart and Moore disappears. In other words, the simple use of outside options in the renegotiation game generates the correct marginal incentives to invest for both parties.
EMPIRICAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING RESEARCH Incentive Conflicts and Control Rights
In this sub-section, we explore the role of incentive conflicts and control rights by reviewing three areas of empirical research: creditor control rights in bankruptcy, creditor control rights outside of bankruptcy, and the incentive effects of leverage buyouts (LBOs) and venture capital (VC) contracts.
Creditor control rights in bankruptcy
Financial contracting theory argues that a critical aspect of debt is the control obtained by lenders after a payment default. This idea is supported in a series of empirical studies. Gilson (1990) finds that bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors when firms enter Chapter 11 or privately restructure their debt to avoid default, and more than half of incumbent directors are replaced. He also finds evidence of an increase in direct creditor monitoring, as is evidenced by restrictive covenants on financial and investment policy in private lending agreements.
9 Hotchkiss (1995) provides evidence that Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings may provide insufficient control rights to creditors relative to managers. She finds that 40% of firms that emerge from Chapter 11 experience operating losses in the three years after emergence, and she argues that the continued involvement of pre-bankruptcy management is strongly associated with post-bankruptcy performance.
In more recent years, an increase in the use of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing with tight covenants has increased the power of creditors in bankruptcy. Post-petition DIP financing, which is usually provided by a group of banks via a syndicated loan, provides special creditor rights to post-petition loans through Section 364 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramirez (2003) ). DIP financing is almost always senior and secured relative to existing claims.
Skeel (2004) provides qualitative evidence on the importance of DIP financing, and argues that "the DIP agreement has become the single most important governance lever in many
Chapter 11 cases" (p. 1906). The mechanism by which DIP financing increases creditor control is described by Skeel (2004) as follows: "By structuring the loan as a revolving credit agreement and imposing strict conditions on each new round of financing, the lender is assured that it will have significant leverage over the debtor's managers' decision-making throughout the Chapter 11 process" (p. 1907).
Using a sample of 153 firms filing for Chapter 11 in 2001, Ayotte and Morrison (2008) provide strong evidence that creditors control most major decisions in Chapter 11. For example, 70% of CEOs are replaced within two years of the filing, and the vast majority of DIP financing contains covenants imposing line-item budgets, profitability targets, or deadlines for submitting a plan of reorganization. Ayotte and Morrison (2008) argue that "in contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equityholders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process" (p. 1). In addition, deviations from absolute priority are rare; they occur in only 8% of cases. This evidence on the declining incidence of deviations of absolute priority is consistent with the findings of Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007) , who also attribute the increase in creditor control and reduction in absolute priority violations to DIP financing.
The increasing presence of control-oriented DIP financing has significantly altered the debate over who controls corporate policy in bankruptcy. While previous research emphasizes the conflict between managers and creditors in bankruptcy, the more recent body of research suggests that the relevant conflict is between secured and unsecured creditors. For example, Ayotte and Morrison (2008) show that objections by the unsecured creditors committee to asset sales and terms of DIP financing are common. Further, they find that when secured lenders are oversecured-meaning, the value of their claims is smaller than the value of the firm-they tend to favor quick resolution and asset sales. In contrast, when secured lenders are undersecured, the cases are relatively long and more likely to result in a traditional reorganization. It is important to emphasize that the prevailing opinion in the corporate governance literature until recently is that creditors play almost no role in corporate decision-making of public firms unless a payment default occurs. For example, although the corporate governance survey of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) covers theoretical research on creditor control rights extensively, they discuss almost no articles showing that creditors play a direct role in corporate governance outside of bankruptcy.
The legal research literature provides qualitative evidence on the importance of creditor control outside of bankruptcy. The central claim of Baird and Rasmussen (2006) is best summarized in their own words: "When a business enters financial distress, the major decisions-whether the CEO should go, whether the business should search for a suitor, whether the corporation should file for Chapter 11-require the blessings of the banks."
Baird and Rasmussen emphasize that it is the holders of private debt-typically banks on syndicated secured term loans and revolving credit facilities-that enjoy broad powers through the use of covenants in private credit agreements (Bradley and Roberts (2004) ). As they emphasize, "when a business trips one of the wires in a large loan, the lender is able to exercise de facto control rights-such as replacing the CEO of a company-that shareholders of a public company simply do not have." The article by Baird and Rasmussen (2006) highlights the crucial role of creditors in corporate governance, and disputes the view that only the board of directors exerts significant control over corporate decisions outside of bankruptcy.
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Covenants are central to the analysis of creditor control outside of bankruptcy given that a violation of a covenant in a private credit agreement gives lenders that right to accelerate the loan. The importance of covenant violations has been recognized in the accounting literature since the 1990s Press (1993, 1995) , Chen and Wei (1993) , Smith (1993) , and Sweeney (1994) The findings on creditor control outside of bankruptcy are important on two dimensions.
First, they show that creditors obtain and exert control over important financial and real decisions even in the absence of payment default. In this sense, they support the framework by Aghion and Bolton (1992) which suggests a more general state space for which control shifts to creditors can occur. The findings also suggest that an explicit consideration of creditors is important even for the grand majority of firms that are current on debt payments. Creditors play an active role in corporate governance even for solvent firms.
Second, the recent work on covenants shows how empirical research motivated by financial contracting theory can answer long-standing questions in corporate finance. For example, researchers have long argued that "financial constraints" may lead to inefficient investment decisions by firms. Financial contracting theory suggests that these financial constraints may emerge endogenously as a result of conflicts of interest between managers and creditors. The empirical research suggests that conflicts of interest are an especially important channel through which financial policy affects investment policy.
Venture Capital and Leveraged Buyouts
There is a substantial body of research that shows the importance of incentive conflicts and control rights in VC contracts. Research by Stromberg (2001, 2003) represents the earliest empirical application of incomplete financial contracting theory to real world contracts. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) study contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. They report several characteristics of real world contracts that are consistent with predictions of financial contracting theory. They find that the allocation of control rights between the VC and the entrepreneur is a central feature of contracts. More specifically, board seats and voting rights are allocated to either the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur depending on financial performance. For example, they find that if EBIT or net worth falls below some threshold, VCs are allocated additional board seats. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that contracts are contingent on a number of events, including financial performance, the offering of securities, and future product development. The finding that contracts are contingent on many events has interesting implications for financial contracting research. Even among these relatively small ventures, contracting parties are able to contract on many verifiable pieces of information. Yet despite the prominence of contingencies, VC contracts allocate control in a manner consistent with incomplete contract theory. This suggests that the most relevant theories of financial contracting are ones in which some signals are available for contracting, but these signals imperfectly capture the full state space.
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Perhaps no other area of empirical research focuses on the disciplinary and incentive effects of debt more than research on leverage buyouts (LBOs). In LBO transactions, the company is taken private, leverage ratios are dramatically increased, and the management team is often reorganized. Jensen (1989) argues that LBOs resolve the central weakness of the public corporation-the conflict between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate resources. He argues that these transactions make remarkable gains in operating efficiency, employee productivity, and shareholder value. Following his earlier work (Jensen (1986) ), Jensen (1989) argues that a primary function of leverage in the LBO transaction is to limit the waste of free cash flow by compelling managers to pay out funds that they would otherwise retain. Kaplan (1989) examines management buyouts completed from 1980 to 1986, and finds that these companies experience increases in operating income, decreases in capital expenditures, increases in net cash flow, and increases in market value. Kaplan (1989) argues that the improved performance is a result of better incentives. His findings are confirmed in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) and Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) . Both Warga and Welch (1993) and Asquith and Wizman (1990) find that pre-buyout bondholders experience losses upon LBO announcements, but these losses are small relative to the gains by shareholders. A review 11 For more information on venture capital contracts, see Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) .
of the literature by Pelepu (1990) suggests that LBOs in the 1980s create value, and that there is little evidence that buyouts lead to widespread layoffs or wage reductions.
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The empirical literature on LBOs in the 1980s suggests that concentrated ownership and high leverage provide powerful incentives for managers to perform. This finding confirms the disciplinary role of debt, as is discussed in the theoretical financial contracting literature (e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Zwiebel (1996) Kaplan and Stromberg (2008) and Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2007) .
Collateral
One of the primary implications of incomplete financial contracts is the importance of liquidation value in financing arrangements. Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) focus on the redeployability of property as determined by commercial zoning regulation. They find that
properties that are more redeployable, and therefore have higher liquidation value, receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations, lower interest rates, and fewer creditors. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that liquidation value matters for ex ante contracts.
Benmelech (2009) exploits the diversity of track gauges in nineteenth-century American railroads to assess the effect of asset liquidation value on financing arrangements. While he does not find evidence that liquidation value affects leverage ratios, he does find evidence that higher liquidation value leads to longer maturities on debt. John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) examine the relation between collateral and public bond yields, and they find that collateralized debt has higher yields than unsecured debt. While this finding appears to contradict the assertion that higher liquidation value leads to cheaper financing, the authors explain these findings in the context of a risk-shifting moral hazard model. Benmelech and Bergman (2009) examine the difference in pricing of debt claims based on collateral and redeployability in the U.S. airline industry. A main advantage of their analysis is a focus on within-borrower variation in the collateral of debt claims. When comparing more secured claims within the same airline, they find that liquidation value and redeployability are negatively correlated with yield spreads. They also show that claims with higher liquidation value have higher credit ratings and higher loan-to-value ratios.
While the literature on liquidation value and ex ante contractual terms is still nascent, the conclusions appear to be broadly consistent with the incomplete contracting hypotheses. In particular, the liquidation value of assets leads to longer debt maturity, lower interest spreads, and higher credit ratings.
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Renegotiation
One of the most important insights of the more recent wave of theoretical financial contracting research is that ex post renegotiation plays a critical role in ex ante optimal contracts.
Contracting parties in an incomplete contracting world understand that renegotiation is likely, and this knowledge shapes the terms of the original agreement.
Early studies of debt contract renegotiation focus on whether debt is restructured inside or outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) find that half of all borrowers that experience severe financial distress restructure their debt outside of formal bankruptcy. Firms that restructure outside of bankruptcy have more intangible assets, owe more of their debt to banks, and owe fewer lenders. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) find that renegotiation outside of Chapter 11 is less likely if there are both secured private loans and numerous public debt issues. Gilson (1997) finds that firms that restructure in Chapter 11 have larger reductions in debt than firms that restructure outside of Chapter 11. He interprets this finding as evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure debt outside of court.
Taken together, the findings on renegotiation in financial distress suggest that the number of creditors plays a crucial role in the ease of renegotiation between creditors and borrowers. The evidence supports the incomplete contracting model by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) . They argue that a benefit of a dispersed group of creditors is that managers know, ex ante, that they cannot extract concessions from creditors by threatening strategic renegotiation. As a result of ex post renegotiation costs, creditors are more willing to provide financing ex ante.
A related article by Benmelech and Bergman (2008) focuses on how liquidation value of collateral affects renegotiation. They focus on U.S. airlines and find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fleet is low. They also present evidence on the importance of strategic renegotiation in the airline industry. Their findings confirm the hypothesis in the theoretical financial contracting literature that liquidation value plays a crucial role in renegotiation outcomes when contracts are incomplete.
While the majority of empirical research focuses on renegotiation of debt contracts in financial distress, Roberts and Sufi (2009b) study all renegotiations of a sample of loan agreements by public firms. They find that renegotiation is extremely likely: over 90% of longterm loan contracts are renegotiated before maturity, and renegotiation is rarely a consequence of distress or default. They also find that renegotiation is determined by the accrual of new information regarding credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations. Finally, they find evidence that ex ante contractual contingencies are used to influence bargaining power of the contracting parties in ex post renegotiation.
The findings of Roberts and Sufi (2009b) suggest that renegotiation is the norm, not the exception, in debt contracts. When the probability of ex post renegotiation is 90% for long term loan contracts, the expectation of renegotiation likely plays an important role in ex ante contractual terms. We believe that empirical research of renegotiation will be an increasingly important area of corporate finance going forward.
Contracting and Interactions with Other Governance Mechanisms
In this section, we review studies investigating the interaction of contracting with other governance mechanisms, and in particular, recent progress in the law and finance literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salina, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) ). In recent years, there has been a small but growing body of literature on the difference between financial contracts across countries with different legal environments. One of the central arguments underlying the law and finance approach is that some environments are more conducive to writing and enforcing financial contracts than others, and that better contracting leads to better outcomes (Qian and Strahan (2007) ). The advantage of the financial contracting approach is that many financing arrangements are prevalent across different countries. As a result, it is possible to exploit variation in legal protection across countries to examine how financial contracting terms vary with the legal environment. Qian and Strahan (2007) study the international syndicated loan market, which is one of the largest and most important global sources of finance. They find that in countries with strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. They also find that foreign banks lending to domestic borrowers are especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic banks as creditor protection falls. Davydenko and Franks (2008) examine how varying degrees of creditors' rights across France, Germany, and the United Kingdom affect lending and reorganization practices. They find that in France, which has the least protection for creditors, loan contracts require more collateral. Further, idiosyncrasies in the French law influence the composition of collateral used in contracts. Despite the differences in the contracts, recoveries in the event of default remain significantly higher in countries with strong creditor protection. Lerner and Schoar (2005) focus on private equity contracts and find that legal enforcement of the country in which the investment takes place has a strong effect on the contractual agreement between the private equity firm and managers. They find that in countries with a common law tradition and better legal enforcement, private equity contracts are far less likely to employ common stock or straight debt, and they are more likely to use convertible preferred stock. In addition, contracts in strong legal enforcement countries are associated with greater contractual protection for the private equity group. In contrast, in civil or socialist legal environments with weaker legal enforcement, private equity contracts are more likely to use straight debt and common stock, and stock ownership is critical to control. Lerner and Schoar (2005) also find that transactions in higher enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns. They interpret this latter result as showing that a reliance on ownership rather than contractual provisions in civil law countries cannot fully offset the negative effects of weak legal enforcement.
14 While the application of the law and finance literature to empirical financial contracting is still at its infancy, the findings thus far are promising. Given the global nature of the financial 14 See also Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2007 Comparing contracts drafted by the same financial institution operating in different legal environments is a promising avenue for identifying the causal effect of law on finance.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section we discuss the empirical implications of more recent theoretical work in dynamic financial contracting, which reflects our belief that dynamic financial contracting models will exert increasing influence on empirical corporate finance research. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) begin with a familiar setting: an agent raises external capital for a project from investors concerned over the agent's ability to covertly divert the project's cash flows for private consumption. The key difference from previously discussed studies is that the business generates risky cash flows over an arbitrary number of future discrete periods, in which the agent can underreport cash flow generated from the initial investment. The optimal contract is a complicated mechanism specifying the payments between the agent and investors, as well as the conditions under which the project is terminated. However, DeMarzo and Fishman show that this mechanism can be implemented with a combination of common securities: equity, long-term debt, and a line of credit.
While others have developed theories for a diversity of securities (e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) , Diamond (1991 Diamond ( , 1993a Diamond ( , 1993b , Bergloff and von Thadden (1994) ), the DeMarzo and Fishman model provides a number of interesting empirical implications, one of which is the appearance of a credit line (Sufi (2009) ). Additionally, capital structure depends on the distribution of the firm's cash flows, both past and future. This view of capital structure stands in stark contrast to more traditional tradeoff views of capital structure mentioned in the introduction, and is very appealing in light of survey evidence that shows the single most important determinant of corporate debt policy is financial flexibility (Graham and Harvey (2001) ) -precisely what the credit line offers. Interestingly, the authors also find that the terms of long-term debt and credit line are independent of the amount financed and, under certain circumstances, the severity of the moral hazard problem. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) extend the DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) model into a continuous time setting, which enables the former study to provide several additional insights.
For example, when the risk of loss from the project is severe, the optimal contract may require that firms hold compensating balances as a requirement for the credit line. Their results also suggest that the firm's total debt capacity (long-term debt plus the credit line) is largely insensitive to the risk of the project and its liquidation cost. Rather, these factors determine the relative usage of these two forms of credit. Recent evidence on the stickiness of debt levels (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) ) and the tendency for firms to "spread" their capital structure across non-price credit terms (Rauh and Sufi (2009) ) suggest further investigation of the theoretical implications is needed.
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Whereas these studies focus primarily on optimal capital structure, a number of other recent dynamic contracting studies provide new insights into firm investment and growth. These studies include Quadrini (2004) , Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) , and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b) . These studies generate a number of implications generated from the large investmentfinancing constraints literature (see Hubbard (1998) ). For example, DeMarzo and Fishman show that current investment is not only positively correlated with cash flow, but also with past cash flows and investment. Further, investment-cash flow sensitivity covaries negatively with firm size and the propensity to pay dividends.
One of the novelties of this literature relative to existing q-theoretic based models (e.g., Whited (2005, 2007) ) is that the mechanism behind the investment-financing relation is fundamentally different. In neoclassical models, more internal funds lower the cost of capital since external capital is costly to raise. In DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b) , the return on investment is what adjusts to the firm's internal cash flow. Specifically, as the authors note: "the return on investment increases with the agent's share of the rents, and the agent's share of the rents rises as a reward for current performance, for which cash flows are a natural indicator." In fact, a recent working paper by DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008) integrates the two literatures by embedding an optimal contracting problem within a neoclassical framework.
CONCLUSION
15 Tchistyi (2008) shows that when the cash flows in the DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) model are correlated the pricing of the credit line increases with the outstanding balance -akin to the performance pricing feature found in many private credit agreements (Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) ).
The optimality of financial contracts has played an important role in corporate finance theory for the past three decades. Theoretical research since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) has recognized the importance of contracts in resolving incentive conflicts between managers and external financiers. Financial contracts, which have long been a focus of corporate finance theory, are now the subject of an increasing body of empirical research.
This survey has focused on these empirical advancements, which have provided novel insights into long-standing questions in corporate finance. For example, studies suggest that optimal capital structure decisions are shaped by concerns over the transfer of control rights to creditors even before bankruptcy. In addition, financing affects real economic activity in part due to creditor constraints on firm investment imposed to mitigate managerial misbehavior. Further, an examination of financial contracts offers unique insights into the role of law in explaining variation in financial outcomes across countries.
While there have been significant advancements in empirical financial contracting, we believe that this body of research is still in its infancy. We hope that this survey provides a compelling motivation for future research explicitly motivated by financial contracting theory.
For example, recent advancements in dynamic financial contracting provide rich theoretical predictions that should motivate further empirical research. In addition, novel and rich data, such as those detailing financial contracts, covenant violations, and renegotiations, should spark additional studies in this area. We believe that a focus on financial contracts, and the underlying conflicts of interest that shape these contracts, will be an important component of empirical corporate finance research in the future.
